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Abstract 
 
Scholars frequently claim that path dependency of the law, the influence of the 
US model of corporate governance, and the role of legal origin and the stage of 
legal development are key for a comparative understanding of shareholder 
protection. This article, however, suggests that these paradigms of comparative 
company law gradually seem to disappear. The basis for our assessment is an 
original leximetric dataset that measures the development of shareholder 
protection for 30 countries over the last 24 years. Using tools of descriptive 
statistics, time series and cluster analysis, our main findings are that all legal 
origins have now in average about the same level of shareholder protection, that 
paternalistic tools have overtaken enabling tools of protection, and that after the 
global financial crisis this area has become a less frequent object of law 
reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent decades have seen a growing internationalisation in debates about 
company law. International organisations, such as the World Bank and the 
OECD, aim to promote good models of corporate governance and domestic 
law-makers have the aspiration to catch up with legal innovations of other 
countries in order to ensure the competitiveness of their companies.1 In 
academia there has also been a growing trend to teach and write about company 
law beyond the domestic level. For example, many universities now offer 
modules on international, comparative or European company law, and a number 
of new books on comparative company law have been published in the last four 
years.2 
 
Given this trend, it may be seen as a positive development that recent research 
in comparative company law has identified certain paradigms on which most 
scholars agree. It is suggested that these can be summarised as follows: first, 
there is the frequent view that the development of company law is path-
dependent, and that therefore the core characteristics of a country’s law are 
persistent and not subject to frequent changes or major shifts.3 Second, it is 
often thought that a market-oriented conception of company law has become the 
dominant one, in particular as we may observe an ‘Americanisation’ of 
company law in many countries of the world.4 Third, in order to explain the 
remaining differences in strength and forms of shareholder protection, many 
scholars claim that legal origins and the stage of economic development are the 
most decisive factors.5 
 
However, this emergence of paradigms can also be thought of as problematic as 
far as they do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. It is the aim of this article to 
provide such an empirical assessment. For this purpose we will use an original 
leximetric dataset about the development of shareholder protection in 30 
countries between 1990 and 2013, and assess these data with tools of 
descriptive statistics, time series and cluster analysis. Doing so, it will be shown 
that those key paradigms have weakened, or even disappeared, in recent years. 
 
The corresponding structure of this article is as follows. In order to set the 
scene, Section 2 explains the previous leximetric research and the current 
dataset on shareholder protection. Section 3 discusses the general development 
of shareholder protection according to this dataset, based on the strength of 
protection in individual countries as well as the aggregates for each of the 
variables. Section 4 presents a time series analysis of this dataset and identifies 
possible structural changes in the shareholder protection index. Section 5 
examines the strength of shareholder protection according to groups of 
countries, namely legal origins and stages of economic development. Section 6 
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uses an analysis based on differences between individual observations in order 
to scrutinise questions of convergence and similarities between legal systems. 
Based on all of these findings, the concluding Section 7 then provides a 
concluding assessment of the aforementioned three paradigms. 
 
 
2. A Leximetric View of Shareholder Protection  
 
The research discussed here derives from a project on Law, Finance and 
Development at the Centre for Business Research (CBR) in the University of 
Cambridge. This project had the aim to review the mechanisms by which legal 
institutions influence financial systems and thereby affect economic 
development. For this purpose, the CBR researchers constructed time-series 
datasets on shareholder protection (as well as creditor and worker protection)6 
and used those data as explanatory variables in regression analysis.7 In addition, 
one of us, together with other researchers, decided to write papers limited to the 
analysis of the legal data, calling this approach ‘leximetric’.8 Thus, in these 
papers, the main interest is in a quantitative presentation of cross-country 
similarities and differences in company law and how those may be interpreted. 
 
In detail, the initial CBR project developed two indices on shareholder 
protection in listed companies. The first one had 60 variables and the project 
members coded the laws of five countries for the years 1970 to 2005. The 
second index reduced the number of variables to 10, but coded 25 countries, 
initially for the years 1995 to 2005. The corresponding datasets have been made 
available on the project website, including detailed explanations of the 
respective legal codings.9 
 
The present article is the first one to present an extension of this latter dataset, 
namely for 30 countries and the years 1990 to 2013. It is based on the coding of 
the ten variables of Table 1, below. The previous papers of the project explained 
the selection of the variables and the approach to coding the law in detail. While 
such choices do not deny the subjective element inherent in such datasets, it can 
be noted that they have been called ‘more sophisticated’ than alternative 
datasets on shareholder protection.10 
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Table 1: Ten-variable shareholder protection index11 
Variables Description 
1. Powers of 
the general 
meeting for 
de facto 
changes 
If the sale of more than 50 % of the company’s assets 
requires approval of the general meeting it equals 1; if the 
sale of more than 80 % of the assets requires approval it 
equals 0.5; otherwise 0. 
2. Agenda 
setting power 
 
Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the capital 
can put an item on the agenda; equals 0.75 if there is a 
hurdle of more than 1 % but not more than 3 %; equals 0.5 
if there is a hurdle of more than 3 % but not more than 5 
%; equals 0.25 if there is a hurdle of more than 5 % but not 
more than 10 %; equals 0 otherwise. 
3. 
Anticipation 
of 
shareholder 
decision 
facilitated 
Equals 1 if (1) postal voting is possible or (2) proxy 
solicitation with two-way voting proxy form has to be 
provided by the company (i.e. the directors or managers); 
equals 0.5 if (1) postal voting is possible if provided in the 
articles or allowed by the directors, or (2) the company has 
to provide a two-way proxy form but not proxy 
solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 
4. Prohibition 
of multiple 
voting rights 
(super voting 
rights) 
Equals 1 if there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights; 
equals 2/3 if only companies which already have multiple 
voting rights can keep them; equals 1/3 if state approval is 
necessary; equals 0 otherwise.  
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5. 
Independent 
board 
members 
Equals 1 if at least half of the board members must be 
independent; equals 0.5 if 25 % of them must be 
independent; equals 0 otherwise 
6. Feasibility 
of director’s 
dismissal 
Equals 0 if good reason is required for the dismissal of 
directors; equals 0.25 if directors can always be dismissed 
but are always compensated for dismissal without good 
reason; equals 0.5 if directors are not always compensated 
for dismissal without good reason but they could have 
concluded a non-fixed-term contract with the company; 
equals 0.75 if in cases of dismissal without good reason 
directors are only compensated if compensation is 
specifically contractually agreed; equals 1 if there are no 
special requirements for dismissal and no compensation 
has to be paid. 
Note: If there is a statutory limit on the amount of 
compensation, this can lead to a higher score. 
7. Private 
enforcement 
of directors 
duties 
(derivative 
suit) 
Equals 0 if this is typically excluded (e.g., because of strict 
subsidiarity requirement, hurdle which is at least 20 %); 
equals 0.5 if there are some restrictions (e.g., certain 
percentage of share capital; demand requirement); equals 1 
if private enforcement of directors duties is readily 
possible. 
8. 
Shareholder 
action 
against 
resolutions of 
the general 
meeting 
Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against a 
resolution by the general meeting; equals 0.5 if there is a 
threshold of 10 % voting rights; equals 0 if this kind of 
shareholder action does not exist. 
9. Mandatory 
bid 
Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety 
of shares in case of purchase of 30 % or 1/3 of the shares; 
equals 0.5 if the mandatory bid is triggered at a higher 
percentage (such as 40 or 50 %); further, it equals 0.5 if 
there is a mandatory bid but the bidder is only required to 
buy part of the shares; equals 0 if there is no mandatory bid 
at all. 
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10. 
Disclosure of 
major share 
ownership 
Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the 
companies capital have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this 
concerns 5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 if this concerns 10 
%; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise 
Note on shading: we classified as ‘enabling’ forms of shareholder 
protection, variables 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and as ‘paternalistic’ forms (here 
highlighted), variables 1, 4, 5, 9 and 10. See the subsequent text for details. 
 
In the present article we analyse the 10 variables * 30 [countries] * 24 [years] = 
7,200 variables of the new dataset. As with the previous datasets, detailed 
explanations of the respective legal codings will be made available on the CBR 
project website. 
 
The original contributions of this article are as follows: first, it is based on a 
considerably richer dataset than previous ones. Compared to the first set of 
papers12 which analysed the data for five countries, the coverage of 30 countries 
enables us to identify any possible differences between groups of countries (say, 
common and civil law countries) in a more reliable way. The countries in our 
sample13 also provide a good mix of developed and developing countries from 
different parts of the world. Compared to the second set of papers, we have 
increased the length of the time-series from 11 to 24 years;14 thus, identifying 
time trends can be achieved more fully. The period from 1990 to 2013 is also 
interesting to examine as it includes events such as the transition to a market 
economy and the accession to the EU in some countries, as well the ‘dot-com 
bubble’ and the global financial crisis.  
 
Second, the present article is the first one that disaggregates the overall index 
into two subsets ‘enabling’ and ‘paternalistic’ forms of shareholder protection 
(see Table 1 with Note). Therefore, this refers to the substantive direction of 
forms of shareholder protection, not the formal difference between default and 
mandatory rules.15 With ‘enabling’ we mean legal tools that provide 
shareholders with certain powers, grant them certain rights, or entitle 
shareholders to certain actions, but it is up to the shareholders to decide whether 
or not to make use of those – for example, the right to appoint a proxy or the 
ability to file a derivative claim. By contrast, ‘paternalistic’ forms of 
shareholder protection have the aim to protect shareholders in all circumstances; 
for example, when a law-maker decides that it is up to the general meeting to 
take certain decisions or to prescribe that some board members need to be 
independent, it takes the paternalistic view that it knows what is best for 
shareholders.  
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Third, this article uses some leximetric tools which go beyond those used 
previously. Both in the previous papers and the present one we show charts with 
aggregates of variables. These can be revealing, for example, in order to track 
changes in shareholder protection over time or in order to examine the relevance 
of country classifications. Yet, this article also uses more sophisticated methods. 
For instance, in order to identify major shifts in a time series, we employ tests 
of change-point detection.16 In addition, an analysis of country pairs according 
to differences between individual variables is used in order to identify clusters 
of countries based on network analysis.17 Thus, such tools provide an 
innovation for the growing field of quantitative comparative research in 
company law. 
 
Fourth, as explained in the introduction, this article is focussed on the question 
of whether established paradigms in comparative company law are still valid. 
This explicit research question is a distinct one of the present leximetric paper. 
It is also an important question to be asked since the last twenty years have seen 
the apparent emergence of such paradigms, yet, often based on merely 
anecdotal evidence. 
 
  
3. General Development of Shareholder Protection 
 
3.1 Comparing Countries, Now and Then 
 
To start with, it is helpful to examine how shareholder protection developed 
from 1990 to 2013. Figure 1, below, shows the aggregates of all ten variables of 
the shareholder protection index for each of the countries in the initial and final 
year of our sample.18 Shareholder protection in 1990 is plotted as vertical 
columns, and shareholder protection in 2013 is plotted as a line. Comparing 
1990 and 2013, one can first observe that every single country in our sample has 
raised its scoring in the last 13 years, with the average increase in the 
shareholder protection scores being 3.09 on a 10-point scale. It is notable that in 
1990, the lowest score of countries with a company law was 0.5 (Slovenia),19 
while in 2013, it was 4.38 (Pakistan).  
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Fig. 1 Shareholder Protection in 30 Countries in 1990 and 2013 
The magnitude of the increase differs, however, as does the overall ‘ranking’ of 
the countries. The five countries with the biggest increase in shareholder 
protection over the 24-year period of study are China (+7.85), Slovenia (+6.88), 
Russia (+5.6), the Netherlands (+5.5) and Estonia (+5.25). On the other hand, 
the top countries in 1990, i.e. Malaysia, France, the US, the UK and Japan, have 
only slightly increased by 0.93 on average. Furthermore, only three countries, 
i.e. China, Russia and France, have managed to rise higher than a score of 7.5 in 
2013. This possibly suggests that more shareholder protection is not necessarily 
‘better’ and company law should strive for ‘optimum’ and not ‘maximum’ 
shareholder protection, ie it should aim to balance between the different groups 
that play a role in the governance of companies.20 With the tools used in this 
article, however, we cannot provide a normative assessment of the distinction 
between maximum and optimum shareholder protection because it would be a 
matter for regression analysis to determine what level of shareholder protection 
is indeed most conducive for a country’s development.21 
 
The overall ‘ranking’ of the countries has also changed. From the top five 
countries of 1990 only France, Malaysia and the UK are also at the top in 2013, 
while the two most shareholder-protective countries in 2013 are China and 
Russia, which both have a score of 7.85. The jump in the Chinese score is 
mainly attributed to the adoption of the Chinese Company Law 2005 which 
introduced some Western standards of shareholder protection, such as a 
shareholder vote to approve large asset sales (Variable 1), a 3% threshold for 
setting an agenda item for the general meeting (Variable 2), a ‘without cause’ 
removal of the management board (Variable 6), and a general derivative action 
that can be raised by 1% of shareholders (Variable 7).22 The increase in the 
Russian score, mainly due to the introduction of the Joint Stock Company Law 
of 1995 and the Russian Corporate Governance Code of 2002, also indicates the 
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influence of Western standards on developing (and transition) economies.23 
Similarly, Turkey has revised its Commercial Code in 2011 to catch up with the 
developed world. Significant progress has also been made by many of the 
countries of the Eastern Europe, especially the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia 
and Slovenia, driven in part by harmonisation with European law.24 
 
This rapid movement towards more shareholder protection in most of the 
transition and developing economies studied combined with the more 
incremental rise in the levels of shareholder protection in more developed 
countries led to some transition systems today having higher levels of 
shareholder rights protection than some of the most developed market 
economies, such as Germany and Switzerland. In particular, it can be seen that 
the frequent company reforms in transition and developing countries tend to add 
new forms of shareholder protection to existing ones: thus, in the terminology 
of institutional research, our findings show that law reform and institutional 
change often do not lead to ‘replacement’ (or ‘displacement’) but to the 
‘layering’ of rules from various backgrounds.25 
 
However, higher scores in the shareholder protection index do not necessarily 
imply that shareholders are more protected unless enforcement mechanisms are 
also in place. Theory suggests that ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ diverge, 
sometimes considerably.26 Thus it is revealing to display the relation between 
the level of shareholder protection (horizontal axis) and enforcement 
mechanisms (vertical axis) plotted in Figure 2. To measure the degree of 
enforcement we use the World of Bank ‘rule of law’ ranking.27 Each of the 
countries in our sample is plotted with a diamond marker in 1996 and with a 
rectangular marker in 2012.28 
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Fig. 2 Relationship between Shareholder Protection and Law Enforcement 
 
Figure 2 shows that developed countries have higher levels of legal enforcement 
than transition countries both in 1996 and 2012. The most surprising aspect of 
the substantial variation in law enforcement is that the high levels of formal 
shareholder protection achieved in many transition economies in the 2010s are 
not mirrored in improvements in the enforcement intensity. Although some 
transition countries, such as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, made some progress, 
others remained almost unchanged or even got worse. Notably, the levels of 
legal effectiveness of China and Russia, the two countries with the highest 
scoring in the shareholder protection index in 2012, remained poor throughout 
the period of study. We also find that there is no positive correlation between 
the levels of shareholder protection and the rule of law neither in 1996 nor in 
2012.29 This evidence confirms previous research that formal legal change is not 
always sufficient to catalyse improvement in law-in-action.30 A likely 
explanation for this gap between law-in-books and law-in-action is that copying 
legal rules is easier than implementing them in the absence of effective 
judiciary, trustworthy legal and administrative infrastructure, and efficient 
political and economic institutions.31 
 
3.2 Development of Different Tools of Shareholder Protection 
 
So far we have considered the level of shareholder protection in particular 
points in time for each of the sample jurisdictions. In this section, as well as the 
subsequent one, we expand our analysis by making use of the longitudinal 
nature of the shareholder protection index and study variations of shareholder 
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protection across time. Figure 3 plots each of the ten variables in the index32 
between 1990 and 2013.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Shareholder Protection Development across 10 Variables 
The ten curves in Figure 3 demonstrate some common features. First of all, in 
general, all of them exhibit an upward movement, which means that on average 
the value of every single variable in the index increased over time. The extent of 
change differs, however, from one variable to another. Notably, Variable 5, 
which codes the law on independent directors, underwent the most significant 
increase of all. While in 1990 all the countries but the United States33 had the 
score 0 for Variable 5, by 2013 every single sample jurisdiction had required at 
least one independent director to sit on corporate boards.34 The idea of 
directors’ independence has been emphasised since the mid-1990s when policy 
makers started to advocate independent directors as a way of providing a more 
effective check on management, while in the post-Enron era codes of corporate 
governance have spread quickly throughout the world aiming, among others, at 
enhancing the role of independent directors.35  
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The values of variables 9 (mandatory bid) and 10 (disclosure of major share 
ownership) have also increased significantly during the sample period.36 It is 
noteworthy that both rules have been subject to European harmonisation. 
Regarding Variable 9, the 13th Directive on takeover bids, adopted in 2004 
provides under Article 5 that if a person – acting individually or in concert with 
other persons – acquires control over a company, he/she is obliged to make a 
full takeover bid for all the remaining voting securities of this company and 
offer the same terms to all shareholders (mandatory bid rule).37 Several EU 
Member States, in our sample, Belgium, Cyprus, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
introduced a mandatory bid obligation implementing the Takeover Directive,38 
while Lithuania and Spain lowered the threshold for mandatory bids to one-
third and 30%, respectively, after the adoption of the Takeover Directive.39 
 
As for Variable 10, the 2004 Transparency Directive, which superseded the 
1998 Large Holdings Directive, tightened up the disclosure rules for significant 
holdings and set the disclosure threshold at 5%.40 However, all of the EU 
Member States in our sample except Estonia had their disclosure threshold set at 
5% before the implementation of the Transparency Directive in 2007. This 
could suggest that changes in the ownership disclosure rules of EU Member 
States do not merely reflect European Union harmonisation efforts.41 
 
In contrast to Variables 5, 9 and 10 which underwent significant change since 
1990, Variable 6 (feasibility of director’s dismissal) has remained, on average, 
almost unchanged between 1990 and 2013.42 Variables 1 (powers of the general 
meeting for de facto changes) and 4 (prohibition of multiple voting rights) also 
remained relatively unchanged over the 24-year period of study,43 while 
Variable 8 (shareholder action against the general meeting), which displays the 
highest scores throughout the 24-year period of study, did not change at all after 
2002.44  
 
4.  Shareholder Protection Time Series Analysis 
 
4.1 Overall Shareholder Protection  
 
Despite differences in the magnitude and pace of increase among the ten 
variables of the shareholder protection index, the overall level of legal 
protection afforded by law to shareholders in our sample countries has been 
increasing since 1990. This is also evident in the left panel of Figure 4, below, 
which graphically displays the aggregate of the ten shareholder protection 
variables between 1990 and 2013.45 This trend challenges the view that the 
development of company law is path-dependent in so far as we provide 
evidence that substantial differences in legal shareholder protection are fading 
away over the last three decades.  
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Fig. 4 Shareholder protection aggregate (left) and first difference of (ln) 
shareholder protection (right) 
 
The literature on institutions often discusses the dichotomy of institutional 
development. For example, it is said that such development is characterised ‘by 
relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction 
that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux’,46 that 
there are the views that emphasise either the ‘dynamic of endogenously 
generated change’ or the ‘responses to external shocks’,47 and positions that 
focus on either ‘the deliberate creation of institutions through the political 
process’ or ‘the spontaneous emergence of institutions through evolutionary 
processes’.48  
 
The time dimension of the shareholder protection dataset enables a closer 
scrutiny of its institutional development. In particular, it can be examined 
whether there are any specific turning points, also known as ‘structural breaks’ 
or ‘change-points’, in the development of shareholder protection over the 24-
year period of study.49 It can then be possible to link such a turning point to a 
particular exogenous event that is likely to be responsible for this change.50 For 
instance, there has been a considerable debate on the relation between 
shareholder protection and the financial crisis of 2008.51 Shareholder 
proponents claim that the financial crisis was at least in part a result of 
inadequate management accountability to shareholders and advocate that 
increased shareholder power will ensure better monitoring of management 
performance and thereby improve firm value.52 Shareholder empowerment 
opponents, however, suggest that more shareholder power did not prevent 
excessive risk-taking, especially by banks, in advance of the financial crisis.53 
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Change-point detection in time series has received considerable attention in 
various fields including statistics, finance, marketing and economic history.54 A 
classical test for mean change detection is the so-called Chow test. This test in 
effect uses an F-test to determine whether the mean of the sample remains 
stable between the two segments split by the change-point. The method, 
however, requires that the change-point is known to the user. 
 
To eliminate the linear trend (left panel of Figure 4, above), we analyse the first 
differences of the natural logarithm (ln) of the shareholder protection data, 
which we denote by Xt = ln(spt) – ln(spt-1), where sp is the shareholder 
protection series. The series Xt is plotted in the right panel of Figure 4 and has a 
length of T=23. In unreported results, we run the Chow test for change-points in 
the mean and for every possible year in the data set Xt. The highest F-statistic 
(11.237) was obtained for t=17 (i.e. year 2007) and the low p-value (0.0003) 
indicates that the change-point is statistically significant. 
 
For robustness we also apply a CUSUM statistic in the mean of the series Xt, as 
an alternative method to detect a change-point in a time series.55 The advantage 
of this method is that no a priori knowledge about the possible location of the 
change point is required. A CUSUM statistic is a cumulative sum of terms and 
the highest value (in absolute terms) of the CUSUM statistic indicates that a 
possible change-point exists.56 The first step of the procedure is to find the most 
likely location b for a change-point. We locate such a point among 𝑏𝑏 ∈{1, … ,𝑇𝑇 − 1} as the one which maximises the following: 
 
𝑌𝑌1,𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏  = factor |(mean of the sample from T=1 up to b) – (mean of the 
sample from b+1 up to T=23)|.57  
 
When the procedure described above was applied to Xt, it returned b=17 (2007) 
as a change-point, in the sense that it represented the maximum difference of the 
mean of Xt. For robustness, we also conducted a t-test for differences in the 
means of the two segments, X1991-2006 (segment 1) and X2007-2013 (segment 2).58 
The means of the two segments are graphically displayed in the right panel of 
Figure 4 by the two horizontal lines. The t-test confirms that the mean of the 
shareholder protection development (Xt) between 2007 and 2013 is lower than 
that between 1991 and 2006 (p-value=0.002). 
 
Both the Chow test and the CUSUM-type change point detection show evidence 
of a shift in the shareholder protection in 2007, in the sense that 2007 represents 
the end point of a segment over which the mean of the shareholder protection 
time series was constant. The vertical line in the right panel of Figure 4 displays 
the change-point as estimated by the two tests. 
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The statistical analysis indicates that although the shareholder protection time 
series follows an increasing trend throughout the period of study, 2007 
represents a change-point after which the development of shareholder protection 
decelerates. Putting these findings into the perspective of the financial crisis, it 
is evident that despite intensified calls for strengthening minority shareholder 
rights, and several legislative measures followed in turn,59 the overall level of 
shareholder protection did not dramatically change in the years following the 
crisis. One possible explanation could be that already by 2007 shareholder 
protection had jumped to an ‘optimum level’ and, therefore, little change took 
place afterwards.60 A related explanation comes from Brian Cheffins who 
suggests that with the possible exception of large firms in the financial sector, 
corporate governance did not fail during the 2008 financial crisis.61 Even though 
the corporate governance mechanisms in place, among which minority 
shareholder protection and the associated shareholder activism, did not prevent 
the crisis from happening, strengthening shareholder powers does not guarantee 
that shareholders will use the powers made available to them to prevent a future 
crisis. Accordingly, the main focus of post-crisis policy reform therefore 
switched to other topics, such as the corporate governance of banks, the risks of 
innovative financial instruments, the role of securitisation (e.g. mortgage and 
asset-backed securities), and the rules on bail-outs/-ins. 
 
4.2 Enabling vs. Paternalistic Protection 
 
Another type of comparison involves disaggregating the overall index into the 
enabling and paternalistic forms of shareholder protection.62 It can be seen in 
Figure 5, below, that both forms of shareholder protection have increased, albeit 
at different rates: thus, in terms of the literature on institutional change,63 we 
observe a ‘layering’ of multiple forms of shareholder protection, not a 
replacement of one type of shareholder protection by another one. 
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Fig. 5 Enabling and Paternalistic Shareholder Protection 
 
A striking pattern that emerges is that paternalistic shareholder protection has 
increased considerably, whereas enabling shareholder protection has not 
changed much. The increase in the paternalistic form of shareholder protection 
is mainly attributed to Variables 5, 9 and 10 whose values, as we have seen 
above, underwent the most significant increase between 1990 and 2013.64 
Considering the thirty countries, all of them are more paternalistic in 2013 than 
in 1990, and for 25 of them the increase in the paternalistic variables is larger 
than the respective increase in the enabling ones.65 
 
This result may be unexpected if one assumes that (i) the enabling variant is 
typical for the US model of corporate law and (ii) that there has been US 
influence on other countries’ company law in recent years. With respect to the 
first aspect of this reasoning, it is important to note that the two categories of 
shareholder protection introduced by the present article distinguish according to 
the substantive direction of forms of shareholder protection,66 not the formal 
nature of those rules.67 The debate about the formal nature of rules of company 
law relates to the well-known distinction between the US model that is 
associated with of the view of the company as a mere ‘nexus of contracts’68 and 
the continental European model with an emphasis on the statutorily fixed nature 
of the company with the company being regarded as an ‘institution’, ‘fiction’ or 
‘real person’.69 But, in substantive terms too, it is possible that US corporate law 
is different from other legal systems.  
 
Indeed, our data confirm this first aspect: the US has high aggregates for the 
enabling variables, between 4 and 4.25 (compare with the average shareholder 
protection in the left panel of Figure 4), while the aggregates for the 
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paternalistic variables are only between 2.25 and 3. This may therefore reflect 
that, in substance, US corporate law is relatively ‘business friendly’ because it 
does not impose many hurdles on companies and their directors.70 By contrast, 
US securities law tends to be more paternalistic. Some of these rules address 
topics that in other countries would be part of company law, for example the 
rules on independent directors.71 Moreover, if one considered not only 
shareholder protection but the law as it applies to companies more generally, 
recent federal laws (eg, the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley and 2010 Dodd-Frank Acts) 
may show that ‘legal paternalism’ can be a prominent feature of US business 
law.72 
 
The second aspect about the ‘Americanisation’ of the law is one of the 
paradigms this article aims to scrutinise.73 Here, the shareholder protection data 
point to a different direction since the US preference for enabling variables is 
contrary to the trend shown in Figure 5. It may also be plausible that the 
paternalistic form of shareholder protection has seen a larger increase in most 
countries. In a recent monograph Marc Moore explains that the conventional US 
model in which private preferences are the key consideration for company law 
rules is a too narrow in today’s world.74 Since all legal systems have to accept 
that the effectiveness of private ordering at the individual firm level has its 
inherent limitations, state interventionism is ‘inevitable’. Moore relates this to 
the normative view that company laws should be ‘coercive and socially-
determinative, aimed at eliciting direct change in the behavioural patterns and 
relative resources of key corporate participants in line with … society’.75 Our 
empirical results can be interpreted as a confirmation of this position, namely 
that law makers indeed take the view that it is acceptable to get actively 
involved in prescribing some rules that matter for a sound company law. In 
particular this may be the case as far as they feel the need to intervene after 
abuses of power in corporate governance, such as in the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s.76 It may also find a more general confirmation in 
the view that today we very much live in an age of ‘regulatory capitalism’;77 
thus, even capitalist societies have a tendency to increase the use of regulatory 
law in recent decades. 
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Fig. 6 First difference of (ln) enabling shareholder protection (left) and first 
difference of (ln) paternalistic shareholder protection (right) 
 
The results of Figure 5 should also be read in conjunction with Figure 6 which 
displays graphically the results of the change-point analysis for the first 
differences of the natural logarithm (ln) of enabling (left panel) and paternalistic 
(right panel) forms of shareholder protection. To detect change-points in the 
mean of the two time series of interest we perform both the Chow test and the 
CUSUM method.78 For enabling shareholder protection, both tests reveal a 
change-point in 1996 which is displayed as a vertical line in the left panel of 
Figure 6.79 Taken these findings together with the moderate increasing trend of 
enabling shareholder protection since 1990 (Figure 5), it can be suggested that 
the 2000s was mostly a period of stability for the development of the enabling 
shareholder protection. It is therefore questionable whether an 
‘Americanisation’ of company law has taken place in the last decade. For 
paternalistic shareholder protection we find a change-point in 2007 displayed as 
a vertical line in the right panel of Figure 6.80 This finding together with the 
growth of paternalistic shareholder protection in the 2000s (Figure 5) 
demonstrates that recent developments focused on paternalistic rather than 
enabling tools of shareholder protection and this resulted in company law being 
more paternalistic rather than enabling today. 
 
Another way to analyse the possible influence of particular models of company 
law is to scrutinise the relevance (if any) of legal origins and other group 
differences between countries. This will be done in the following section.  
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5.  Development According to Groups of Countries 
 
5.1 Legal Origin and Shareholder Protection 
 
For the last two decades, four financial economists, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, often referred to by the 
initials of their surnames as LLSV, and an array of co-authors and independent 
scholars drew on the work of prominent traditional comparatists to group 
countries into legal traditions or origins,81 and documented pervasive 
correlations between cross-country differences in legal origin, on the one hand, 
and investor (shareholder and creditor) protection, regulation of labour markets, 
government ownership of banks, entry regulations, firm valuation, and 
numerous other spheres of economic activity, on the other.82 In their seminal 
‘Law and Finance’ article LLSV classified forty-nine countries into two broad 
legal origins or legal families – common law (English legal origin) and civil law 
(French, German and Scandinavian legal origin) – and argued that shareholder 
protection varies systematically across countries, with English legal origin 
countries providing more shareholder protection than countries with civil law 
origin, in particular French legal origin, do.83 Subsequent studies conducted by 
three of the LLSV authors (LLS) and Simeon Djankov include an additional 
sub-category of Socialist legal origin within civil law.84 
 
Adopting the LLS/Djankov’s classification, we group our sample countries into 
four legal origins: English, French, German and Socialist.85 Of our sample of 30 
countries, there are eight English common law countries (Canada, Cyprus, 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, the UK and the US), ten French civil 
law countries (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Turkey) and four German civil law countries (Germany, 
Japan, Sweden86 and Switzerland). We also retain the category of Socialist law 
which emerged from the Soviet Union and was spread to former Soviet 
Republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia) and Eastern European 
countries (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia), while it was also imitated by 
other countries, such as China. 
 
Figure 7, below, presents the shareholder protection of our sample countries by 
reference to the legal origin of English, French, German and Socialist law. First 
of all, each of the legal families has a higher score in the general level of 
shareholder protection over time. However, despite the general rising trend of 
shareholder protection, there are certain differences in the pattern of change 
between the four legal families. In particular, while the English-origin systems 
exhibited a greater general level of shareholder protection than civil-origin 
systems over the period 1990-2000, civil-origin systems showed a remarkable 
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increase over the same period and after 2000 they started to catch up with the 
common law counterparts.   
 
 
Fig. 7 Shareholder Protection by Legal Origin 
A considerable increase in shareholder protection is particularly marked in 
countries with Socialist legal origin. Indeed, in 1990, Socialist legal-origin 
countries had the lowest aggregate value of the shareholder protection index 
(1.562), while in 2013 they scored the highest of all four legal families 
(6.717).87 The very low scores in the shareholder protection index of this legal 
family in the early 1990s is attributed to the lack of fully-fledged company laws 
in many Socialist countries. For instance, the People’s Republic of China did 
not have any formal national company law until 1992.88 The other Socialist 
countries have also made substantial efforts to strengthen shareholder protection 
since the inception of economic liberalisation in the mid-1990s introducing 
company law reforms and adopting Western standards of company law. For the 
Socialist countries which are now members of the European Union (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia) the rise in the level 
of shareholder protection is also part of the European harmonisation process.89 
 
Socialist legal origin countries might offer greater shareholder protection on 
paper since 2006 than English legal origin countries do, but formal legal change 
towards more shareholder protective rules does not necessarily imply ‘better’ 
shareholder protection. First of all, it should be remembered that the efficacy of 
shareholder protection rules is not a function only of their substantive content, 
but also of their enforcement. Indeed, there is no positive correlation between 
the levels of formal shareholder protection as measured by the shareholder 
protection index and legal effectiveness as measured by the rule of law.90 
However, when we focus on Socialist-legal origin countries, we do find a 
negative and statistically significant correlation between the rule of law and the 
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level of shareholder protection.91 Thus, it may be argued that formal shareholder 
protection and enforcement operate as substitute mechanisms in Socialist 
countries: countries that lack an efficient judicial enforcement and non-legal 
enforcement resources (for example, self-regulatory institutions) may develop 
strong formal shareholder protection laws in order to provide at least some 
safeguard of owners’ rights.92 Alternatively, it can be suggested that, due to 
their weaknesses in terms of ‘rule of law’, these countries feel the need to signal 
to foreign investors that they have decent shareholder protection, even if this is 
more a form of ‘window dressing’.93 
 
It is also noteworthy that even if we group the shareholder protection variables 
into enabling and paternalistic forms of shareholder protection the overall 
picture does not change much. English-legal origin countries used to offer more 
enabling and paternalistic shareholder protection in the 1990s, but this has 
changed now. There has been a fairly constant increase in enabling shareholder 
protection throughout the period of study and all legal families now score more 
than 3 points on its 5-point scale.94 As for paternalistic shareholder protection, 
Socialist countries scored the highest of all legal families since 2006.95 
 
What do these findings tell us about the legal origins theory? First and foremost, 
it can be seen that the belonging to a particular legal origin does not prevent 
strengthening shareholder protection, especially in civil law countries. In fact, 
all three civil law families had a faster rate of increase than the English common 
law one over the 24-year period of study.96 These results are also suggestive of 
a convergence around common law standards which have been associated with 
‘best practice’ in corporate governance, most notably the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. For instance, Variable 5 (independent board 
membership), which was diffused in the world by international standards of best 
practice, such as the OECD Principles of 2004, underwent the most rapid 
increase of all.97 Yet English common law countries had a higher average score 
in respect of Variable 5 over the period 1990-2013. This is not an unexpected 
finding since from the standpoint of the legal origins theory we should expect 
the diffusion of legal rules and norms to be more extensive between countries of 
the same legal family.98 But any legal origin effect had only a limited impact, 
especially until the early 1990s, and did not prevent civil legal origin systems 
from undergoing a rapid movement towards many features of the common-law 
model. The division into different legal origins or families may, therefore, no 
longer be a meaningful criterion of differentiation between different shareholder 
protection systems.  
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5.2 Economic Development and Shareholder Protection 
 
The previous section casts doubt on one of the main claims of the legal origins 
hypothesis, namely that the quality of laws governing shareholder protection 
differs systematically according to the legal origin. The second and related 
claim is that law matters to economic development, in the sense that there is a 
positive relationship between shareholder protection and economic 
development.99 To examine this claim we divide the sample by whether a 
country is developed or developing based on the IMF’s classification.100 Of the 
total 30 countries fifteen are in the developed country category (Belgium, 
Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US), while 
the remaining are categorised as developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Estonia, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa and Turkey).  
 
Figure 8 shows the aggregate of enabling and paternalistic tools of shareholder 
protection in developed and developing countries. Enabling shareholder 
protection is plotted as vertical columns and paternalistic shareholder protection 
is plotted as lines. Developed and developing countries are displayed in dark 
and light shades of grey colour, respectively.  
 
Fig. 8 Shareholder Protection by Economic Development (IMF 2010) 
In relation to enabling tools of shareholder protection, developing countries 
have lower scores throughout the 24-year period of study than developed 
countries do. This should not be surprising because developed countries tend to 
have more sophisticated institutions, both legal ones (such as competent courts 
and supervisory authorities) and non-legal ones (such as professional investors, 
specialised auditors, lawyers, consultants and financial press) that can steer a 
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‘proper’ application of enabling forms of shareholder protection. Another 
explanation may derive from the ‘law matters’ hypothesis.101 From this 
standpoint, developed countries might perform better than developing countries 
in enabling shareholder protection because their advanced legal system 
promotes financial sector development. However, the causality relationship 
between economic development and shareholder protection may also run in 
reverse direction, and economic development may precede legal development 
rather than vice versa.102 
 
Notably the difference in enabling shareholder protection between the two 
groups of countries decreased over time, as developing countries gradually 
enacated more and more enabling forms of protection.103 A greater increase, 
however, is discernible in relation to the level of paternalistic shareholder 
protection in developing countries. In particular, although both (developed and 
developing) paternalistic curves show a remarkable increase over the period of 
study,104 developing countries have overtaken developed ones since the mid-
1990s. There are several plateaus and steps in the developing countries’ 
paternalistic line and there are points in time where the two groups had similar 
levels of paternalistic shareholder protection. Nevertheless, developing 
countries clearly had more paternalistic protection than developing countries for 
most of the studied period. The jump in the developing countries score indicates 
the influence of the ‘strong state’ in economic development. This may be in line 
with the ‘Beijing consensus’ view of economic development and the diffusion 
of the model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative to neoliberal ideas of 
Western economies among developing countries.105 
 
It is also interesting to examine how the tension between enabling and 
paternalistic forms of shareholder protection evolved over time within the 
developed and developing countries groups. For developed countries, we 
observe greater levels of enabling shareholder protection throughout the study 
period. For developing countries, by contrast, the level of paternalistic 
shareholder protection has overcome enabling shareholder protection since 
2002. This finding is consistent with the claim that for corporate law to play a 
facilitative function it must be combined with other legal, market and cultural 
control mechanisms which are often absent in developing countries. Or, to put it 
in the words of Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, 
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‘[t]he assumptions that support the enabling model are clearly inapposite in 
emerging economies, where informational asymmetries are severe, markets 
are far less efficient, contracting costs are high because standard practices 
have not yet developed, enforcement of contracts is problematic because of 
weak courts, market participants are less experiences, reputable 
intermediaries are unavailable or prohibitively expensive, and the economy 
itself is likely to be in flux’.106 
These contextual features might explain why developing countries seem to 
favour a paternalistic model of shareholder protection since the early 2000s. A 
greater level of paternalistic protection might also compensate for the low 
probability of enforcement in these countries.107 
 
Despite the greater paternalistic protection afforded by developing countries 
since the early 1990s, we find that shareholder protection at the aggregate level 
is less in developing countries throughout the period of study. Yet the difference 
in shareholder protection between the two groups decreased over time and 
developing countries have been catching up with their developed counterparts 
mainly due to the increase of paternalistic protection in these countries. It is 
notable that from 1990 to 2013 the aggregate shareholder protection in 
developing countries increased from 2.844 to 6.207 on a 10-point scale 
compared to an increase from 3.571 to 6.378 in developed countries. 
 
Overall, the findings presented in this section suggest that, as with the legal 
origins claims, the state of economic development is of little relevance for 
today’s company laws. Rather, as economic conditions come closer together,108 
the law on shareholder protection also becomes more similar, at least as far as 
the positive law is concerned.  
 
6. Analysis Based on Differences between Individual Observations  
 
6.1 Convergence or Divergence in Shareholder Protection 
 
Up-to-now this article analysed the data as a measure of the strength of 
shareholder protection, be it as the aggregate of all ten variables or as the sub-
aggregates of enabling and paternalistic forms of shareholder protection. But 
there is also another way to make sense of our dataset. The following is based 
on the thinking that if, for example, two countries have an aggregate score of 
five out ten variables, their underlying laws may be very different since 
different variables may have led to the same score.  
 
Therefore, to highlight the precise differences between countries, it is necessary 
to calculate for each variable whether there is a difference between the two 
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countries, and then aggregate those differences.109 Given the time dimension of 
our dataset, it is then possible to trace whether and how over the last 24 years 
such differences have evolved. For example, this may show how far there has 
been convergence or divergence of the formal legal rules (in this subsection),110 
and how far countries that had similar laws in 1990 are still similar in 2013 (see 
the subsequent one). 
 
If one examines how different each of the thirty countries is from the other 29 
countries of our dataset, this leads to (30*29)/2 = 435 country pairs, ie time 
series. As it would not be feasible to display all of those graphs, Figure 9, 
below, focuses on five times series. The first four deal with the difference 
between all countries, ie the average value for each variable, and the respective 
variables in French, German, UK and US law. France, Germany and the UK (or 
England) are often seen as the three ‘origin’ countries that have influenced the 
laws of other countries of the world. In particular, there is the aforementioned 
‘law and finance’ view that French, German and English legal origins are the 
main building blocks of most legal systems of the world.111 In addition, it is 
interesting to examine how the differences from US law have evolved because it 
is sometimes said that there has been a significant ‘Americanisation’ of other 
countries’ laws in recent years.112 Finally, the figure displays the development 
for ‘all countries’, ie the general trend of whether there has been convergence or 
divergence of the law. 
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Fig. 9 Convergence or Divergence in Shareholder Protection 
 
The general trend line shows that there has been convergence of the legal rules 
on shareholder protection: the average difference of all country-pairs has 
dropped from a maximum of 2.74 in the early 1990s to 2.23 now. This may not 
be seen as considerable change; yet, it is interesting to note that this trend has 
been gradual and steady throughout the time series, without any change-points, 
eg, with the dot-com bubble, the accession of new member states to the EU or 
the global financial crisis.113 Overall, this confirms previous research which, 
using more limited time series, found that countries have, generally speaking, 
converged in the law on shareholder protection. This research also explained 
that the most likely driving forces for such a development are the 
transplantation of certain ‘fashionable’ concepts of company law, for example, 
the need to provide independent directors or to disclose major shareholder 
ownership.114 
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Throughout the period, German law was more similar to the rest of the countries 
than French, UK and US law though there has been a slight divergence in recent 
years. The initial similarity can be explained by the relatively low levels of 
shareholder protection in Germany in the early 1990s which were similar to 
most of the other countries but different from French, UK and US law.115 The 
subsequent German reforms were then also replicated in many of those other 
countries, for example, in the transition economies of Eastern Europe.116  
 
In Figure 9, France, the UK and the US have been in a tight battle. Initially, the 
US was a bit closer to the other countries but this changed in 2003 – to be 
precise due to the requirement of the NYSE listing rules that half of the board 
members shall be independent.117 This was followed by some convergence 
since some of the other countries also introduced or strengthened the law on 
independent directors118 But, overall, the comparison of the time trends does not 
indicate that the US-model of corporate law has won the day. Conversely, 
countries have more steadily converged to the laws of the UK and France. As 
these two graphs are fairly similar, it is not possible to say whether, in this 
respect, there has been a global trend towards the common law or the civil law 
approach in company law. 
 
We have also conducted further analyses distinguishing between groups of 
countries and variables. First, it may be thought that the convergence could 
predominantly be the result of EU harmonisation. Thus, we distinguished 
between non-EU and EU countries (based on the current membership) and this 
showed that the convergence was indeed mainly due to the latter countries. 
Examining the data more closely, we also found that it is mainly the 2004 
accession countries that have determined this trend. However, the time trend 
already started in the early 1990s and there is no apparent change point in 2004 
in Figure 9: thus, while two of our variables are related to EU law,119 overall, it 
is the more general law reforms of transition economies, and not EU 
harmonisation, that have been the main driving force for this convergence of the 
law. 
 
Second, we return to the distinction between enabling and paternalistic 
variables. At the aggregate level, the main trend has been that legal systems 
have increased the use paternalistic forms of shareholder protection while 
enabling forms have stayed relatively stable.120 However, if we consider the 
change at the level of differences for each variable and country-pair, it is the 
enabling variables that account for the convergence of the law.121 The likely 
explanation is that, with respect to these variables, there is indeed a consensus 
emerging.122 By contrast, the introduction of paternalistic forms of shareholder 
protection is more contentious: thus, while there is a common trend, details have 
remained more diverse.  
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6.2 Re-examining the Composition of Groups 
 
The previous section of this article examined the relevance of categories such as 
legal origins and stages of economic development.123 An alternative approach is 
to start without such a priori categories in order to find out whether particular 
countries seem to belong together. A popular way of identifying such groups are 
cluster analyses which can be defined as: 
‘(…) multivariate procedures that divide a data-set into a number 
of subgroups (clusters). In general, they refer to measures of 
similarity or dissimilarity between observations with respect to a 
set of variables. These are then grouped into clusters of low within-
cluster variance and high variance between clusters. In particular, 
this can be achieved by successively increasing the tolerated level 
of within-cluster dissimilarity.’124 
In the present case, the 435 country pairs125 can be regarded as a valued network 
that shows the difference between each pair.126 With the help of a network 
analysis program,127 it is then possible to calculate ‘optimisation clusters’. This 
refers to a formal method that ‘optimises a cost function which measures the 
total distance or similarity within classes for a proximity matrix’.128 The user 
has to determine in advance how many clusters shall be created. In the present 
case, this has been done for various numbers for the years 1990, 2001 and 2013. 
The results with the highest explanatory power (R2) are presented in Figure 10.  
 
 
Explanatory powers (R2): 0.504 (1990); 0.340 (2001); 0.347 (2013) 
 
Fig. 10  Clusters in 1990, 2001 and 2013   
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The chart shows that in all three years there is one large cluster of mainly civil 
law countries. Some common law countries occasionally join this cluster (eg, 
Pakistan in 1990, India and Malaysia in 2013) and gradually this cluster has 
become a bit smaller (from 21 to 17 members). The countries that have 
remained in this cluster (in bold) are all civil law countries. 
 
In 1990 the smaller cluster may also be interpreted along legal-family lines as it 
has mainly common law countries, as well as Japan which in company law has 
also been influenced by US corporate law.129 But, this changed in the 
subsequent years: there have been frequent variations in memberships and 
groups do not appear to be very persistent. In 2001, we have three smaller 
mixed common-civil law clusters. Two of these clusters are also mixed in terms 
of developed and developing countries. In 2013, these groups have changed 
again but not in line with the common and civil law categories. It may be 
possible to observe some distinction between stages of economic development, 
eg, with France and the US in one cluster. Yet, overall, these categories do not 
seem to be very intuitive. Moreover, it can be seen that the explanatory power 
of the clusters (R2) has dropped as compared to 1990.  
 
The main explanation for this development is that, in today’s world, rules of 
shareholder protection are not necessarily different any more just because 
countries are from different legal families and continents.130 This is also in line 
with previous CBR research which found that, in recent years, legal transplants 
and other forms of influence (say, through the OECD or the World Bank) tend 
to break up the established divisions between groups of countries in company 
law.131 
 
It is also suggested that this result is consistent with the general trend towards 
legal convergence. In the political science literature it is sometimes suggested 
that the development is towards ‘polarisation’ or ‘dual convergence’, meaning 
that groups of countries will share similar models.132 But, at least for the 
question of shareholder protection, our results show the reverse trend: initially, 
there may have been some justification to talk about countries belonging to 
distinct groups, but now – together with the overall trend towards convergence 
– these group differences have faded away.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This article has used an original leximetric dataset in order to scrutinise three 
key paradigms of comparative company law. The first paradigm, suggested in 
the introduction, was that company law may be path-dependent, and that 
therefore the core characteristics of a country’s law may be persistent and not 
subject to frequent changes or major shifts. It speaks against this statement that 
all countries of our study have engaged in reforms strengthening various tools 
of shareholder protection.133 Some of our specific results may support the view 
of remaining path-dependencies, namely that, since 2007, changes in 
shareholder protection have become less frequent, and that there are still some 
differences between developed and developing countries.134 But the other 
specific findings of this article speak against the strong influence of path 
dependencies: in the 24 years, paternalistic tools have overtaken enabling tools 
of shareholder protection and the discrepancy between legal origins has faded 
away, both at the aggregate level and if one examines the differences between 
each variable for each country pair.135 
 
The second paradigm was that a market-oriented conception of company law 
may have become the dominant one, in particular as we may observe an 
‘Americanisation’ of the law in many countries of the world. It may be regarded 
as a confirmation of this statement that, according to to our findings, the 
requirement of independent directors has indeed spread from the US to other 
parts of the world.136 However, in our taxonomy this requirement is not an 
‘enabling’ but a ‘paternalistic’ form of shareholder protection,137 and therefore 
not a typical feature of a market-oriented company law. More generally we also 
do not find that a ‘US-style’ company law has won the day. In contrast to any 
such expectations, the data show that there is the trend towards paternalistic 
forms of shareholder protection, that civil law countries have now laws with as 
strong shareholder protection as common law countries, and that US law is 
fairly untypical as compared to the laws of the other countries.138 
 
The third paradigm, mentioned in the introduction, claimed that, in order to 
explain the remaining differences in strength and forms of shareholder 
protection, legal origins and the stage of economic development are likely to be 
the most decisive factors. The general trend shows, however, that all legal 
systems have strengthened both enabling and paternalistic tools of shareholder 
protection regardless of legal origin and stage of economic development.139 
More specifically, the group-based analyses have demonstrated that all legal 
origins have now in average about the same level of shareholder protection, and 
that both developed and developing countries follow the same trend in terms of 
stronger reliance on paternalistic tools of shareholder protection.140 
Furthermore, clustering the countries, it can be seen that, since the 2000s, 
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groups of similar countries do not necessarily share the same legal origin and 
stage of development.141 
 
Reflecting on the wider implications of our findings, we could see that in 
company law certain ‘fads and fashions’142 have spread around the world since 
the early 1990s. But it is also revealing that we found a change-point in both the 
aggregate and paternalistic shareholder protection time series in 2007 being the 
result of the fact that reforms in shareholder protection have become less 
frequent in recent years. Thus, it seems to be the case that, following the global 
financial crisis, policy makers have now turned their main attention to other 
matters of business law, notably banking, securities and financial law. A further 
important general finding concerns the transition and developing countries of 
our study. While these countries have not been immune from the 
aforementioned dynamics, they have also followed a distinct trajectory as far as 
they rely more on paternalistic forms of shareholder protection than developed 
countries. This shows that, despite global trends, law-makers can be able to 
deviate from influential models in company law.  
30 
 
Notes 
 
1 There is a wide literature on these issues: see eg, A Dignam and M Galanis, 
The Globalization of Corporate Governance Farnham: Ashgate 2009; D 
Milman, National Corporate Law in a Globalised Market: The UK Experience 
in Perspective Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009; AR Pinto, ‘Globalization and 
the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2005) 23 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 477. 
2 AM Fleckner and KJ Hopt (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: A 
Functional and International Analysis Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2013; M Siems and D Cabrelli (eds), Comparative Company Law – A Case-
Based Approach Oxford Hart 2013; R Bohinc, Comparative Company Law: An 
Overview on US and Some EU Countries’ Company Legislation on Corporate 
Governance Berlin: VDM 2011; A Cahn and DC Donald, Comparative 
Company Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010. 
3 Eg, LA Bebchuk and MJ Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127; MJ Roe, 
‘Corporate Law’s Limits’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 233; DM Branson, 
‘The Very Uncertain Prospect of ‘Global’ Convergence in Corporate 
Governance’ (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 321. 
4 Eg, H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ 
(2001) 88 Georgetown Law Journal 439; BR Cheffins and RS Thomas, ‘The 
Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay’ (2004) 1 Berkeley Business 
Law Journal 233; E Greene and P-M Boury, ‘Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate 
Governance in Europe and the USA: Americanisation or Convergence?’ (2003) 
1 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 21. 
5 Eg, R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Law and 
Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 (hereinafter Law and 
Finance); R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 285 
(hereinafter Legal Origins); K Pistor, ‘Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder 
Protection and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies’ (2000) 1 European 
Business Organization Law Review 59. 
31 
 
6 For papers discussing the relationship between those datasets: J Armour, S 
Deakin, P Lele and M Siems, ‘How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a 
Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection’ 
(2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 579 (hereinafter How Do 
Legal Rules Evolve); J Armour, S Deakin, V Mollica and M Siems, ‘Law and 
Financial Development: What We are Learning from Time-Series Evidence’ 
(2009) BYU Law Review 1435 (hereinafter Law and Financial Development); M 
Siems, ‘Convergence in Corporate Governance: A Leximetric Approach’ 
(2010) 45 The Journal of Corporation Law 729; M Siems, ‘The Web of 
Creditor and Shareholder Protection: A Comparative Legal Network Analysis’ 
(2010) 27 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 747. 
7 Eg, J Armour, S Deakin, P Sarkar, M Siems and A Singh, ‘Shareholder 
Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal 
Origins Hypothesis’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 359; D 
Katelouzou, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Corporate Law: 
An Empirical Analysis Across Twenty-Five Countries, PhD Thesis, University 
of Cambridge, 2013. See also M Siems and S Deakin, ‘Comparative Law and 
Finance: Past, Present and Future Research’ (2010) 166 Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 120. 
8 P Lele and M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach’ (2007) 
7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 17. This term was first used in RD Cooter 
and T Ginsburg, ‘Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some 
Countries than Others’ (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=456520. 
9 See http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/completed-
projects/law-finance-development/ (previously: 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/project2-20.htm).  
10 AM Pacces, ‘How Does Corporate Law Matter? ‘Law and Finance’ and 
Beyond’, in Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth (Michael Faure 
and Jan Smits eds, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011) 297 at 304. 
11 Source: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/project2-20output.htm 
and M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection Around the World (‘Leximetric II’)’ 
(2008) 33 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 111, 116-9. 
12 This distinction refers to the difference between the first and the second 
shareholder protection index, see text accompanying n 9. 
32 
 
13 The latter formal distinction is frequently discussed in the company law 
literature. See references and further explanations infra n 67-69 and 
accompanying text. 
14 Note that the coding was done between May and November 2013. Thus, the 
2013 data reflect slightly different points in time for different countries. 
15 See also infra Section 4.2.  
16 See infra section 4. 
17 See infra section 6. 
18 In this article we use the following abbreviations: AR (Argentina), BE 
(Belgium), BR (Brazil), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CL (Chile), CN 
(China), CY (Cyprus), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Germany), EE (Estonia), ES 
(Spain), FR (France), IN (India), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV (Latvia), LT 
(Lithuania), MX (Mexico), MY (Malaysia), NL (Netherlands), PK (Pakistan), 
PL (Poland), RU (Russia), SE (Sweden), SI (Slovenia), TR (Turkey), UK 
(United Kingdom), US (United States) and ZA (South Africa). 
19 This coded the law for Yugoslavia. As Figure 1 shows, China had a score of 0 
in 1990 but this was due to the fact that prior to the Opinion for Joint-Stock 
Companies of the State Restructuring Commission from 15 May 1992, China 
did not have a general company law but only some local company laws in the 
special administrative regions (SARs). The Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1988 was not a 
company law in a modern sense (eg, it did not have shareholders as outside 
investors). 
20 Lele and Siems, supra n 8, 34. The role of different groups of stakeholders is 
also a prominent feature of M Blair and L Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 248. 
21 For such research see, eg, supra n 5 and 7. 
22 For a comparative analysis of those development see also M Siems 
Convergence in Shareholder Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2008, at 94, 158, 165 and 217. 
33 
 
23 K Pistor, M Raiser and S Gelfer, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ 
(2000) 8 Economics of Transition 325 at 327. Given its choice of countries, the 
present article distinguishes between developed and developing countries, with 
the latter including transition economies. See also infra, section 5. 
24 This concerns variables 9 and 10. See further infra, section 3.2. 
25 See, eg, K Thelen, ‘Institutional Change in Advanced Political’, (2009) 47 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 471; J Mahoney and  K Thelen ‘A 
Theory of Gradual Institutional Change’, in Explaining Institutional Change: 
Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (J. Mahoney and Thelen, K. eds. New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 1. 
26 R Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law 
Review 12; JL Halpérin, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of 
Legal Change’ (2011) 64 Maine Law Review 1.  
27 The World Bank Governance Indicators, available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx
?source=worldwide-governance-indicators. Rule of law measures ‘the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence’. 
28 We examined these two years since these are the earliest and latest year for 
which both datasets are available. 
29 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the shareholder protection index 
and the rule of law is 0.173 in 1996 and 0.131 in 2012, and not statistically 
significant. 
30 Pistor and others, supra n 23, 344.  
31 See eg B Black, R Kraakman and A Tarassova, ‘Russian privatization and 
corporate governance: what went wrong?’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 
1731; D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard, ‘Economic development, legality, 
and the transplant effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165. 
32 See supra, section 2. The precise data will also be made publicly available on 
the website, cited supra n 9. 
34 
 
33 For the United States, see New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Manual B-23 
(1966): at least two independent directors.  
34 See Article 15 of Decree 677/2001 and General Resolution 400/2002 by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (for Argentina); 2009 Belgian Corporate 
Governance Code, Article 8.8; 1999 Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance, revised in 2001, 2004 and 2009, item 2,12 (item 2.16 in the 2009 
version) (for Brazil)); Toronto Stock Exchange Manual sec. 472(2); Corporate 
Governance Act 2009 (for Chile); 2001 Opinion issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and Company Law 2005, Article 123; 2002 Cypriot 
Corporate Governance Code, Article A.2; 2001 Czech Corporate Governance 
Code, Chapter IV; 2006 Estonian Corporate Governance Recommendations, 
sec. 3.3.2; 2003 French Corporate Governance Principles no. 8.2 [now 9.2]; 
2002 German Corporate Governance Code No. 5.4.2; 1998 Voluntary Code: 
The Confederation of Indian Industries, Recommendation 2; 1999 Preda Code 
(revised in 2002 and 2011) Article 3 and 2004 Civil Code Art. 2384 c.c. and 
Art. 2409 (for Italy)); Companies Act Article 400(3) and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Listing regulations (2009), Rule 436-2 (for Japan); 2005 Principles of 
Corporate Governance, s 8.6 (2010 revised version s 7.6) (for Latvia); 2003 
Lithuanian Corporate Governance Code, Principle III; Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, Part II and 2001 and 2001 Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) (now the Bursa Malaysia since 2004) 3.04; Code of Best 
Corporate Governance Practices (1999) pg.7 and 2005 Stock Market Act Article 
24 (for Mexico); Tabaksblat code (2004) sec III.2.1 (for the Netherlands); Code 
of Corporate Governance 2002 revised in 2012 (for Pakistan); The Code of Best 
Practice for Pubic Companies 2002 (and 2005 as amended) at pt.17 (for 
Poland); 2002 Russian Corporate Governance Code, sec 2.2 of Chapter 3 and 
Decree of the Federal Commission for Securities Market No. 03-1169/r of 18 
June 2003; 2005 (and 2007) Slovenian Corporate Governance Code, sec 3.3.1, 
2009 Corporate Governance Code and Company Law (ZGD-1); Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) Listing Requirements, Rule 3.84 and King III report 
(2009) (for South Africa); Aldama Report (2003) 2.1.c, Companies Act 2010 
Article 538 and Unified Code of Corporate Governance (for Spain); Swedish 
Code of 2004, 3.2.4; 2002 Code of Best Practice issued by Economie Suisse, sec 
IIb § 12 (for Switzerland); 2003 Turkish Corporate Governance Code 3.3 (for 
Turkey); Code of Best Practice 1992, s. 2.2 and Combined Code 2003, A.3.2 
(currently UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012, B.1) (for the UK); Listed 
Company manual of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE Manual) B-23 
(1966) and 2002 NYSE Manual § 303A.01.  
35 See eg RV Aguilera, ‘Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: an 
Institutional Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 16 British Journal of 
Management S39. 
35 
 
36 Between 1990 and 2013, Variables 9 and 10 increased by 0.59 and 0.43 on a 
1-point scale, respectively. 
37 Article 5 of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids Of [2004] OJ L142/12. 
38 See for Belgium, Article 5 of the Law of 1 April 2007 on public takeovers 
(Loi relative aux offres publiques d’acquisition); for Cyprus, Law 41[I]/2007, 
Article 13; for Latvia, Law of the Financial Instrument Market 2004 (in effect 
since 13 July 2006), Article 66; and, for the Netherlands, Financial Supervision 
Act, sec.5:70(1). 
39 See, for Lithuania Law on Securities Market, Article 31 (amended in 2007); 
and, for Spain, Article 60 et seq. Stock Market Act 1998, Royal 
Decree1066/2007 and Note 8/2008 issued by the National Securities and 
Exchange Commission.   
40 Article 9 of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EG 
Of [2004] OJL 390/38. 
41 MC Schouten and MM Siems, ‘The Evolution of Ownership Disclosure 
Rules’ (2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 451, at 463-4. 
42 Variable 6 increased by 0.05 on a 1-point scale over the 24-year period of 
study. 
43 Between 1990 and 2013, both Variables 1 and 4 increased by 0.183 on a 1-
point scale. 
44 Variable 8 has an average score of 0.904 on a 1-point scale between 2002 and 
2013. 
45 Note that, in order to show this change most clearly, the y-axis of Figure 4 
displays the values from 3 to 7. See also L Epstein and AD Martin, An 
Introduction to Empirical Legal Research Oxford: OUP 2014 at 253-4 
(explaining why there are good reasons not always to start scales at zero). 
46 G Capoccia and RD Kelemen, ‘The Study of Critical Junctures Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism’ (2007) 59 World 
Politics 341. 
36 
 
47 PA Hall and K Thelen, ‘Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism’ 
(2009) 7 Socio-Economic Review 7, 16. 
48 C Kingston and G Caballero, ‘Comparing Theories of Institutional Change’ 
(2009) 5 Journal of Institutional Economics 151. 
49 It is noteworthy that detecting a change-point in a time series is different from 
identifying a ‘critical juncture’, a concept that has been introduced by the 
literature on institutional change. Whereas a change-point in a time-series can 
be understood as the time location at which the parameter(s) of the data 
generating process change abruptly, a critical juncture refers to ‘relatively short 
periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that 
agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest’. See Cappocia and Keleman, 
supra n 46, 348. It is also important to note that a change-point divides a time 
series into two segments with each segment having exactly or approximately 
constant parameter values. 
50 This is different from regression analysis that would, based on a priori 
reasoning, specify a particular year and then test whether there was a significant 
effect for this year. 
51 See, eg J Mukwiri and M Siems, ‘The Financial Crisis: A Reason to Improve 
Shareholder Protection in the EU?’ (2014) 41 Journal of Law and Society 51; A 
Dignam, ‘The Future of Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial 
Crisis’ (2013) 36 Seattle University Law Review 639; A Reisberg, ‘Shareholder 
Value after the Financial Crisis: A Dawn of a New Era?’ (2013) 10 
International Corporate Rescue 143. 
52 See, eg LA Bebchuk, ‘The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Value’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 1637. 
53 See, eg BW Bratton and WL Wachter, ‘The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment’ (2010) 158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 653; D 
Ferreira, D Kershaw, T Kirchmaier and E-P Schuster, ‘Shareholder 
Empowerment and Bank Bailouts’ (2012), ECGI Finance Working Paper No 
345/2013; Asian Finance Association (AsFA) 2013 Conference, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392. 
37 
 
54 For a review of the econometric literature on change-points see BE Hansen, 
‘The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in U.S. Labor 
Productivity’ (2001) 15 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 117. For a recent 
review of change-point detection methods, see KK Korkas and P Fryzlewicz, 
‘Multiple Change-point Detection for Non-stationary Time Series Using Wild 
Binary Segmentation’ (2014) Joint Statistical Meetings (JSM) 2013, available at 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/KORKAS/WBS_LSW.pdf. 
55 For an application in economic history, see O Christodoulaki, H Cho and P 
Fryzlewicz, ‘A Reflection of History: Fluctuations in Greek Sovereign Risk 
between 1914 and 1929’ (2012) 16 European Review of Economic History 550 
(detecting change-points in the variance and not in the mean of the time series 
of interest).  
56 Due to the small sample size (T=23), we do not consider multiple change 
points in Xt. Hence, we do not rule out the possibility of multiple change points. 
57 Or, in a more mathematical way 
𝑌𝑌1,𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏     �(𝑇𝑇−𝑏𝑏) ∙ 𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇  �1𝑏𝑏  ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡=1 −  1𝑇𝑇−𝑏𝑏   ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡=𝑏𝑏+1 �  
where 𝑌𝑌1,𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏  is interpreted as the difference between the means of 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 over the 
two segments {1, …, b} and {b+1, …, T}, adjusted by a multiplicative factor of 
the form �(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑏𝑏) ∙ 𝑏𝑏/𝑇𝑇. 
58 The shareholder protection time series does not have autocorrelation, in 
which case there is no concern raised with regards the t-test which assumes 
independent variables. 
59 In the US, for instance, the Delaware General Corporation Law and the 
Model Business Corporation Act were amended to allow corporations to 
provide for majority (rather than plurality) voting with the election of directors. 
See eg SM Bainbridge Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis New 
York: Oxford University Press 2012, at 216-220.  
60 See supra, section 3.1. 
61 BR Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance ‘Fail’ During the 2008 Stock 
Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500’ (2009) 65 Business Lawyer 1. 
38 
 
62 See supra, section 2. 
63 See the references supra n 25. 
64 See supra, section 3.2. 
65 The exceptions are Belgium, Brazil, Japan, Malaysia, and the US. 
66 See supra, section 2. 
67 For those see, eg. R  Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: 
A Comparative and Functional Approach 2nd edn Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2009 at 19-27 (for the discussion about ‘law versus contract’ in corporate 
law); BR Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1997 at 31-46 (distinguishing between permissive, 
presumptive and mandatory rules). 
68 This view goes back to EF Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the 
Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288; FH Easterbrook and DR 
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law  Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press 1996.  
69 For those conceptions see, eg, NHD Foster, ‘Company Law Theory in 
Comparative Perspective: England and France’, (2000) 48 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 573; Siems, supra n 22, 47. 
70 This is often related to the role of regulatory competition in US corporate law, 
see eg R Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law Washington, DC: 
AEI Press, 1993, at 39-40. 
71 In the shareholder protection index, the US aggregate of paternalistic 
variables considers the high US score in variable 5 on independent directors 
(since 2003 half of the board members have to independent according to NYSE 
Manual, § 303A.01 approved by the SEC, SR-NYSE-2002-33 and SR-NASD-
2002-141, 68 Fed. Reg. 64154). 
72 To be sure, this is also heavily criticised: eg, R Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance’ (2005) 114 Yale 
Law Journal 1521; SM Bainbridge, ‘Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II’ (2010-11) 95 Minnesota Law Review 1779. More 
generally see RegData, available http://regdata.org, said to be ‘an innovative 
new way of measuring the size and scope of US federal regulation’. 
39 
 
73 See supra, section 1. 
74 MT Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State Oxford: Hart 
2013. See also MT Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The 
Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism’, (2014) 34 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 693 (discussing UK corporate governance). 
75 Ibid,  4. 
76 See Black and others, supra n 31. See also supra, section 5. 
77 See, eg J Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for 
Making It Work Better. Cheltenham: Elgar 2008; D Levi-Faur, ‘Varieties of 
Regulatory Capitalism: Getting the Most Out of the Comparative Method’ 
(2006) 19 Governance 367. 
78 See supra, section 4.1. 
79 In unreported results we run the Chow test for change-points in the mean and 
for every possible year in the enabling shareholder protection data set. The 
highest F-statistic (6.898) was obtained for 1996 and the p-value (0.015) 
indicates that the change-point is statistically significant. The CUSUM-type 
change point-detection also returned 1996 as the only change-point. 
80 After performing the Chow test in the mean and for every possible year in the 
paternalistic shareholder protection data set, the highest F-statistic (16.149) was 
obtained for 2007 (p-value=0.001). Similarly, the CUSUM-type change point-
detection returned 2008 as the only change-point. 
81 R David and JEC Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: an 
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, London: Stevens and Sons 1985; 
TH Reynolds and AA Flores, A Foreign Law Current Sources of Codes and 
Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World, Littleton, Colo.: Rothman 1989; 
K Zweigert and H Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1998.  
82 For a review of the economic literature, see La Porta and others, Legal 
Origins, supra n 5, 286. 
40 
 
83 La Porta and others, Law and Finance, supra n 5, 1117-9 and 1133-4. A 
corresponding finding is S Djankov, R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A 
Shleifer, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (2008) 88 Journal of 
Financial Economics 430 (reconsidering the initial LLSV index as well as using 
another index for a director’s self-dealing transaction). 
84 See, eg R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘Government 
Ownership of Banks’ (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 265; S Djankov, R La 
Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘Courts’ (2003) 118 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 453. On the category of socialist law, see also La Porta 
and others, Legal Origins, supra n 5, 288.  
85 It is important to emphasise that the classification of our sample countries to 
four legal families is only used for comparing our results with the LLSV’s 
studies. For an analysis of the shortcomings of the legal origins/families 
distinction, see eg M Siems, ‘Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and 
Comparative Law’ (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 55, 62-70. More generally 
see also S Deakin and K Pistor (eds), Legal Origin Theory Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar 2012. 
86Although Sweden was treated by LLSV as part of the Scandinavian civil law 
tradition, we choose not to keep the Scandinavian legal origin as a separate legal 
family (with one member) for present purposes and we categorise Sweden as a 
German-origin system. See similarly Armour and others, Law and Financial 
Development, supra n 6, 1473, fn 119. 
87 It is noteworthy that all of the three countries with the biggest increase in 
shareholder protection over the period 1990-2013, ie China, Slovenia and 
Russia, belong to the category of Socialist legal origin. See supra section 3.1. 
88See supra n 19 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra, section 3.1 and 3.2. But see also infra, section 6. 
90 See supra, section 3.1. 
91 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the shareholder protection index 
and the rule of law in Socialist legal origin countries is -0.933 (p-value=0.01) in 
1996 and -0.820 (p-value=0.05) in 2012. 
92 See also infra, section 5.2 (text accompanying endnotes 106 and 107). 
41 
 
93 We are grateful to Gerhard Schnyder for this suggestion. 
94 In 2013, the enabling shareholder protection in English-, French-, German- 
and Socialist-legal origin countries had a score of 3.238, 3.008, 3.313 and 3.016 
on a 5-point-scale, respectively. 
95 In 2013, Socialist-legal origin countries had a score of 3.701 (on a 5-point 
scale) in terms of paternalistic shareholder protection, whilst English, French- 
and German-legal origin countries scored 3.116, 3.309 and 3.138 respectively. 
96 Between 1990 and 2013, the aggregate value of the shareholder protection 
index in English-, French-, German- and Socialist-legal origin countries 
increased by 1.412, 3.007, 2.555 and 5.154 on a 10-point scale, respectively. 
97 See supra, section 3.2. The recommendation to have a sufficient number of 
independent directors is in Section VI.E.1. of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2004. 
98 See Armour and others, supra n 7, 363-4. 
99 This is mainly said to happen through improvements of financial 
development, say, stimulation of external finance through stock markets, eg in 
La Porta and others, Law and Finance, supra n 5. For further discussion see M 
Faure and J Smits (eds), Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth 
Cambridge: Intersentia 2001. 
100 IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010), available at 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/ (with the terminology ‘advanced’ 
and ‘emerging’).  
It is noteworthy that from 1993 to 2004 the IMF used an additional grouping of  
‘countries in transition’ to capture countries the economies of which were in ‘a 
transitional state … from a centrally administered system to one based on 
market principles’. Seven countries in our sample, four former Soviet Republics 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia) and three Eastern European countries 
(Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia), fall in this category between 1993 and 
2004. However, in 2004, on the occasion of the accession of several Eastern 
European countries into the European Union, the transition countries group was 
dropped. For a detailed account of different development taxonomies, see L 
Nylsen, ‘Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: 
How it is Done and How it Could be Done’ (2010) IMF Working Paper 
WP/11/31, available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1131.pdf. 
42 
 
101 See supra n 99. 
102 On a succinct summary of this causality problem, see Siems, supra n 22, 
231-3. See also the references to the institutional change literature supra n 46-
48. 
103 The average difference in the scores of enabling shareholder protection 
between developed and developing countries was reduced from 0.615 to 0.358 
(on a 5-point scale) from 1990 to 2013. 
104 On the general increase of paternalistic shareholder protection in our sample 
countries during the period of study, see supra section 4.2. 
105 Eg T Ambrosio, ‘The Rise of the ‘China Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’: 
Evidence of Authoritarian Diffusion?’ (2012) 18 Contemporary Politics 381. 
106 B Black and R Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ 
(1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911, 1924. 
107 Ibid, 1916. 
108 For empirical studies showing economic globalisation see, eg, A Dreher, N 
Gaston and P Martens, Measuring Globalisation – Gauging its Consequences 
New York: Springer 2008 (with data available at 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch); A McGrew, ‘The Logics of Economic 
Globalisation’ in Global Political Economy 3rd edn (John Ravenhill ed., 
Oxford: OUP 2011) 275 at 279-291 (data on trade, finance, production, and 
labour migration); E Prasad, K Rogoff, S-J Wei and MA Kose, ‘Effects of 
Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’, 
IMF Working Paper 2003, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.pdf. 
109 For this approach see also Siems, supra n 11; Lele and Siems, supra n 8, 37. 
110 This ‘formal convergence’ may be distinguished from ‘functional 
convergence’, namely where the mere strength of shareholder protection (ie the 
aggregate) becomes more similar. See Armour and others, How Do Legal Rules 
Evolve, supra n 6, 620. 
111 See supra, section 5.1. 
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112 See supra, section 1, as well as section 4.2 (for the enabling features of US 
law). 
113 In results, not reported here, we conducted a Chow test and a CUSUM 
statistic in the mean of the time series of the development for ‘all countries’  
(see supra section 4.), not finding a change-point in this time series. 
114 See the references in supra nn 6-8. 
115 The aggregate values for 1990 are: Germany 3.08, France 6.75, US 6.75, UK 
6.125. 
116 This mainly concerns the variables on independent directors, derivative 
actions, mandatory bid and ownership disclosure (5, 7, 9 and 10). 
117 NYSE Manual, § 303A.01. This coincided with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 
118 See variable 5 in Fig. 3 as well n 34 in supra section 3.2. 
119 See supra, section 3.2. 
120 See supra, section 4.2. 
121 The precise numbers are: the average difference for the five paternalistic 
variables dropped from 1.38 to 1.29, and the one for the five enabling variables 
from 1.29 to 0.96. 
122 Eg, in 2013, variable 8 has the value ‘1’ in 25 of the 30 countries; no legal 
system scores ‘0’ for variable 2, and only one of them does for variable 6; see 
also Note to Table 1 above for the classification of variables. 
123 See also supra, section 5. 
124 M Graff, ‘Law and Finance: Common Law and Civil Law Countries 
Compared: an Empirical Critique’ (2008) 75 Economica 60 at 72. 
125 See supra, section 6.1. 
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126 Such an approach of pairs (or dyads) is also used in political science and 
international relations: eg, T Sommerer  and others, ‘The pair approach: what 
causes convergence of environmental policies?’, in K Holzinger and others 
(eds), Environmental Policy Convergence in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, 144-95. For the idea of a ‘comparative legal network 
analysis’ see Siems, supra n 6 (web of creditor and shareholder protection). 
127 UCINET, available at https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home. 
128 Definition at http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm.  
129 See generally Daniel Kelemen and Eric C. Sibbitt, ‘The Americanization of 
Japanese Law’ (2002) 23 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Economic Law 269.  
130 Similar the findings at the aggregate level. See supra section 5.1. 
131 References in supra nn 6-8. See also supra, section 5. 
132 C Hay, ‘Globalization’s Impact on States’, in J Ravenhill (ed), Global 
Political Economy, 3rd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 312-44 at 
320; C Hay, ‘Common Trajectories, Variable Paces, Divergent Outcomes? 
Models of European Capitalism Under Conditions of Complex Economic 
Interdependence’ (2004) 11 Review of International Political Economy 231. 
133 See supra section 3. 
134 See supra sections 4.1 and 5.2. 
135 See supra sections 4.2, 5.1 and 6. 
136 See supra section 3.2. 
137 See supra section 2. 
138 See supra sections 4.2, 5.2 and 6. 
139 See supra section 3. 
140 See supra section 5. 
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141 See supra section 6.2. 
142 BR Cheffins, ‘The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship’ (2004) 63 
Cambridge Law Journal 456. 
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